Media Coverage in Afghanistan

Christian over at Ghosts of Alexander has the interesting idea of tracking this story about the killing of the Kandahar Police Chief to see how information comes out of Afghanistan. While his analysis of the project will be out later this week, Registan also has an overview of reporting on the event. He repeats that analysis of a reporter friend in Kandahar “there is a feeling of ‘the final straw’ in people’s reactions to the news.".

...the initial reports were wrong, but that seems to drive opinion in many parts of Afghanistan—whatever you heard first, so it is. Some unreported context to the incident...who knows how that might have affected things as well.

Did the U.S. or Coalition have a hand—even a very indirect one—in today’s killing? We won’t know for a bit... If—and this is a big “if,” as we just don’t know yet—this turns out to have connections to SF-types, the General McChrystal’s much ballyhooed push for a lighter special operations footprint is certainly off to a great start.

This is not only an important story its an important reminder of the role that western media plays in establishing local opinion about events.

Ikhwan

Three high ranking members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt were arrested over the weekend, including Dr. Abdel-Moneim Abu el-Fotouh, Member of the Executive Bureau of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Secretary-General of the Arab Doctors’ Federation, a notable reformer and strong voice of moderation within the party. The Arabist notes:

Aboul Fotouh in particular is one of the MB’s most popular figures, respected well beyond their ranks for his intellectual calibre and moderation. Considering all [three] of these people were involved in the fundraising drive and aid effort to Gaza, and the Egyptian government has just reopened the border, one wonders whether there’s any connection... I should add that several companies close to those arrested and other prominents MBs have been shut down, dealing a further financial blow to the group.

However, 13 members were released yesterday after a court declared them innocent of money laundering. Official statements by the Ikhwan characterizedthe new arrests not only as a continuation of the regimes oppression of the group's at "reform, coordinating with all the political and national powers in Egypt, and forming a coalition with the Egyptian masses."

Additionally "Detentions emphasize the failure of the existing regime in various fields, whereas its inability to bring security to the nation as these deeds are directly in the service of our US-Zionist enemies tarnishing Egypt's reputation internally and abroad." Given the language of the statment and the arrested man's connection to Gaza relief efforts that is mentioned in several of the statements, its seems fairly clear that the Brotherhood is inclided to agree with teh Arabist about the reasons for the arrests.

Events both in Gaza and in Egypt have positioned the Brotherhood to wield more electoral cout then they have in quiet some time, and in many cases they are calling for democratization. I wonder if events in Iran, where many in the west have strongly supported a coalition of protesters that includes moderat Islamist parties, might shape events in Egypt, eccelerating the formation of a coalition to demand Mubark steps down in the coming years.

Coitus Interruptus in Iraq

Well its pull out day in Iraq. In accordance with the SoFA, US forces had until today to withdrawal from urban areas (in fact it was announced that Iraqi and US forces were prepared for the change over early). The recent upsurge in violence has many concerned about what the ramification of the agreement, negotiated last year, will be. There have also been some last minute adjustments, including allowing the US forces to continued to utilize MRAPs while on daylight patrol, instead of limiting forces to the use of more lightly armored Humvees as had been agree to originally.

Below is a list of predictions, and explanations of why this is a important (or unimportant) milestone from a range of sources, offering various levels of reassurance that though the sky may be falling, it isnt going to today:

Tom Ricks may be the most depressing of the lot, arguing:

Yes, Iraqi units are better trained and equipped than in the past. But that was never the problem. Rather, the point of failure was political. Sunni death squads and Shiite militias knew what they were fighting for, while an Iraqi soldier didn't necessarily. My worry is that I don't see the political situation as being much different than it has in the past.

While hes right to point out the current political weakness, as well as the possibility for increased corruption with the withdrawal of the Americans from the cities, its just not clear what he thinks would have been a viable alternative, given the fact we couldnt negotiate a slower time table into the SoFA, either last fall when it was written or in the previous alterations.

Peter Feaver at Shadow Government has more specific concerns in the same vein, particularly that the SoFA is overly ambitious, and that the upsurge in violence could be the trigger for a wave of violence that "at least in 2006, the terrorists were able to use... to seize the initiative".

He is particularly concerned by many of the points raised by Stephen Biddle in this piece, who strongly advocates a slower withdrawal than that provided for in the SoFA timetable, but in the end is cautiously reassured by Odierno's faith in the timetable, given his previous skepticism (this piece is a few days old so it isnt clear whether the complement of the withdrawal ahead of deadline would have further cemented this view).

A fairly similar view has also been expressed by Anthony Cordesman, and the gang at CNAS, both of whom still thinks we'll need a long term presence in the region. However both these pieces as well as the Biddle piece are taking a much longer view then Feaver is giving them credit for when he claims that pulling out from the cities may be the straw that breaks the camel's back.

There also a good critic of their long term assessment over at Musings on Iraq, though I think he simplifies their position in unfair ways. but thats for another post.

Ibn Muqawama (subing in for Exum) at Abu Muqawama responds to concerns over the uptick by noting that there has not (as yet) been any sign that the attacks are triggering the type of sectarian reprisals that were so problematic 3 years ago.

Instead, he says we should focus on helping efforts to better integrate the sects into the government, particularly the Kurds which he thinks is the more likely fault line for the next round of violence. I've been holding for the last 5 years that the "next" round of conflict was going to involve the Kurds, and, with a few exceptions, I've been wrong over and over again, so Im withholding judgment on this one. At any rate, this issues arent ones that US military strength can do much to solve so he doesnt see a need to slow the withdrawal plan.

Marc Lynch at Abu Aardvark seems to think that this is actually a false marker, seeing as how we've been drawing down our troops for months now. While he applauds the effort Obama and the commanders in the field have made to honor the deadline, its for symbolic rather than practical reasons.

There's a lot of anecdotal evidence of mounting popular anxiety, but very little evidence of those kinds of conflict dynamics kicking in. For what it's worth, both Iraqi and American officials seem confident... I'm not particularly an optimist on these matters, any more than I was in the past -- but I also see a rapidly declining ability or need for the U.S. to manage these issues.

Instead, he points to a multitude of problems with the intigration of Sunnis, particularly former members of the SoI and Kurds, who have never felt as strong a sense of connection to the central government. He also points out the there has been little done to improve the situation facing Iraqi refugees/IDPs. Like Ibn M, his conclusion is that "slowing down the American drawdown would not materially improve any of these issues."

Chris Dierkes at the Atlantic Council basically agrees with Lynch, but adds that much of the negative analysis is not willing enough to ascribe agency to Iraqis (on the academic end of things, this echos compelling arguments that Libby Wood has made). He instead argues:

In the absence of the US filling the void left in the wake of the destruction of the Baath dictatorship, civil war raged. That civil war was a political war... But nature abhors a vacuum. That vacuum was filled by the ensuing conflagration, which was purely predictable given sufficient knowledge of how these things play out–the Iraqi local circumstances filled in the details of that otherwise recognizable general pattern.

And that Civil War was won by the Shia. Definitively.

and then moves on to discuss the realities of dealing with this newly reveled Shia victory in similar terms to Ibn M and Lynch.

However, even this view fail to really capture the weight of the "symbolic" deadline for many Iraqis. Attackerman quotes sources describing the scene as:

It's a "carnival" in Baghdad, according to the Post's Ernesto Londono, filled with Iraqi troops grinning as they take their lives into their own hands and graffitti writers further south demanding, "Pull your troops from our Basra, we are its sons and want its sovereignty." Don't tell them tomorrow is just another day.

At the end of the day though, the biggest difference seems to be not in the analysis of what Iraqs future problems will be, but rather weather a continued American military presence could reasonably be expected to do anything to help prevent another wave of conflict. I generally tend to side with the school of thought that military forces arent going to do much to help with the next generation of problems, however (and this is a substantial caveat) I have a distinct feeling that the Iraqi Army and Police have underestimated the level of training they require, and our "training and advisory" mission is going to need to be scaled up from the current timetable at later stages of the withdrawal plan.

Honduras is America's Turkey?

Today's news that the army overthrow the president of Honduras after he threatened to overrule the term limit law that would have forced him out of office, in favor of the president of Congress. With both the legislative and judicial branches backing the army's actions, it seems a little odd to me that the leadership of the Americas including Obama has been so quick to denounce the move (ok this reference to moving against the USA shaky record in the region makes a fair point).

While Latin America is not a region I know much about, it seems to me that what has happen here is not so much equivalent of, say, the 2002 coup in Venezuela, but rather to the habit the Turkish army had for much of the 20th century of overthrowing rulers who began to demonstrate authoritarian tendencies. While a regular role for the military enforcing democratic norms may seem counter-intuitive to American norms, the Turkish military is quiet proud of what it sees as its role in defending the legal order, and has produced one of the more recognizably democratic countries in the old school third world. This same thing could be whats going on in Central America now.

Afghan exhibit at Met in NYC till Sept 20th

I saw this exhibit of art from the Kabul national Museum, curated by National Geographic last summer at the National Gallery in DC... its now at the Met in NYC. I really recommend seeing it if you can, both because of the gorgeous work in the collection, and the incredible story it represents.

This exhibition highlights the amazing rediscovery of the Silk Road treasures from Central Asia, thought to have been lost during decades of warfare and turmoil in Afghanistan. These masterpieces of the Kabul Museum collection remained hidden for twenty-five years, thanks to the heroism of the Kabul Museam's staff, who had secretly crated them and placed them in the vaults of the Central bank in the presidential palace. It was only in 2004 that the crates were opened to reveal that these wrks had survived intact.

A couple of my favorite images, reproduced on the Met's website are below:


Indian influenced scuplture from the 1st or 2nd century CE


Goldwork clasp showing the greek god Eros with local Afghan fish motif, 1st-2nd cent CE

Plaster cast of a Hellonistic style medalion of a youth 1st-2nd century CE

These three items demonstrate the range of styles and influences that is common in the art of the exhibit, and goes a long way to demonstrating some of the unique cultural confluences that occured in Afghani history.

A new gold standard?

Joseph Stiglitz has a good piece in Vanity Fair about the possible repressions of the American financial meltdown on both the global economy and Americas philosophical place in the world. Its worth reading in its entirity, but a little thing in it caught my attention [emphasis is mine]:

The dollar has long been the reserve currency—countries held the dollar in order to back up confidence in their own currencies and governments. But it has gradually dawned on central banks around the world that the dollar may not be a good store of value. Its value has been volatile, and declining. The massive increase in America’s indebtedness during the current crisis, combined with the Federal Reserve Board’s massive lending, has heightened anxieties about the future of the dollar. The Chinese have openly floated the idea of inventing some new reserve currency to replace it.

My understanding was that the use of the dollar by foreign banks was intended to replace a global gold or silver standard. how does one creat a currency that is able to act as a solid reserve currency out of whole cloth, unless you go back to some level of direct conversion between resources and monetary units. Is this basically what China wants to do (and if so how) or has my lack of Economic knowledge struck again?

Common econ kids I'm looking to you to explain this one...

Hippies and Mullahs

So my mother, while not actually a hippie, always liked folk music, so I was raised hearing many of the standbys. maybe that's why this version of "We Shall Overcome" with a verse in farsi, sung by Joan Baez strikes me as being so lovely.

Appeal to the Bazaaris?

Juan Cole is reporting that plans are underway for a new round of protests tomorrow morning.

This is a way for them to achieve a shop strike indirectly, hurting the economy and putting pressure on the regime.

While the economic effects of this are certainly useful, and as Cole notes there are distinct strategic advantages to the close quarters of the market places, it seems to me that there could also be some inportant signaling going on here.

A major element of the coalition that eventually overthrow the Shah was the traditional merchant class, or Bazaaris (this paper is an interesting look at the economic motivations for the alliance). I cant help but think that a motive for the location of this new round of protests it to force the Bazaari to chose a side here, because if the security forces start taking down the markets, thier interest will be seriously threatened.

Hey! how about the rest of the that there Dar al-Islam

Wanted to quickly highlight a couple of interesting pieces that are not about Iran, Iraq or Afghanistan.

Fistful of Euros generally covers Europe, but today there's an interesting analysis of Senegal as a outlying Islamic democracy in Africa.

So why doesn’t Senegal get any respect?

Really. Whenever you see pundits talking about democracy and Islam, it’s all “well, Turkey, and perhaps Indonesia, ummm, maybe Malaysia? Wait, does Albania count?”

It’s hard to avoid thinking that Senegal gets overlooked because it’s, you know. Down there.

But Senegal’s not even alone. Two other Francophone West African countries — Mali and Niger — are far down the road to democracy.

Its a good point, particularly given the medias tendency to only be able to follow one story at a time.

and for your COIN decorating needs

I knew that there were rugs like this produced during the Soviet occupation, but this is the first I've seen that has the updated weapons of the GWOT. I'm going to wait to purchase until they come in predator drone.

h/t Strange Mats via Noah

Early signs on the results of the US withdraw

Reuters is reporting demonstration at the site of one of yesterdays bomb blasts in Baghdad. I'll be very interested to see whether these continue if the violence does, as to my knowledge this type of explicit call for Iraqi responsibility for population protection is new, and a very positive sign of US success in the SOFA mandated handoffs.

New ROE in A-stan

I've been working on a few bigger pieces, hence the delay in posting, but I wanted to highlight the shift in the Rules of Engagement for Afghanistan that was announced yesterday. I wish the piece had included the specific language but if this reading:

U.S. officials said the rules were designed to reduce the use of bombs, missiles and other heavy weaponry in populated areas. They will require U.S. forces that come under fire from militants operating out of houses and other buildings that may contain civilians to end the engagement and leave the area, officials said.

The restrictions could force commanders to be more cautious in the mission-planning stage and eschew operations likely to require operations in populated areas, according to an officer serving in Afghanistan.

The rules make clear exceptions for situations where the lives of U.S., North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Afghan personnel are in danger, U.S. officials said.

is correct, then this is really going to limit individual commanders options when planning operations. While I approve of the "population-centric" mindset that this change privileges, I'm a bit concerned that this is part of a general trend that allows high level commanders a much greater ability to micro-manage engagements, if the new RoEs are written in a way that requires troops on the ground to check in and justify the use of CAS.

h/t to Spencer Ackerman

UPDATE: more details and some good commentary here

Oy vay...

Israelis are up in arms over a photo of Obama on the phone to Netanyahu with his shoes propped on the desk so the soles face the viewer.

It is considered an insult in the Arab world to show the sole of your shoe to someone. It is not a Jewish custom necessarily, but Israel feels enough a part of the Middle East after 60 years to be insulted too.

Does this strike anyone else as deeply ironic?

How to fix the academics of COIN

David Betz just finished writing a history of the academic study of insurgency, and has posted the "post card" version over at King of War. In the piece he identifies several lingering holes in the literature, and talks a bit about where to go from here. Before I put in my two sense, I should probably note that much more of my experience is in studying issues that are linked to insurgencies (ethnic violence, extremist opposition political and social movements and terrorism) then insurgency proper, which I'm sure biases my view.

Betz points to a few major flaws in the current literature

1. that academic studies focus on when insurgencies succeeded and ignore the failure, biasing the sample set
2. the continued lack of clarity about what makes an insurgency different from a conventional fight
3. the assumption that a counter insurgency is less able to utilize propaganda, because they are held to a higher level of truth
   

While i admit the third point is completely valid, it also just isnt my baby in the same why that it is for Betz.. Like wise, I find the current work being done on the 'virtual dimension' interesting and relevant, but not as thrilling as he does. However, the first two holes, and the second area of advancement he mentions, Social Network Theory, are all big things for me.

His first point, that academics bias their sample to successful insurgencies, isnt a new problem. The studies of revolutions that were so popular 30 years ago had a similar issue. In fact, i think insurgencies studies is actually doing a better job here then scholars of the 1980's did, because for every person studying insurgents, theres someone studying counterinsurgency as an issue, so both sides are getting a fairer shake.

That being said, its still a gap in the literature, and I suspect that it's going to remain one. First of all, theres usually much more data to work from in cases where an insurgency is successful (or at least high profile and long-running). Theres more news stories written, more members to talk to, and more battles to analysis in these cases. There's also just an undeniable bias in the public's (even the academic public) interest, creating publishing incentives to work on cases that are recognizable, rather then more obscure failed cases.

One way to get around this problem to at least some degree that Betz doesnt mention is for scholars to pull from a wider range on political science writing. The literature on ethnic violence and social movements often looks at cases that dont fall into the traditional COIN cannon, but are good examples of resistance movements that fail to form successful insurgencies (for example S. Wilkinson has written extensively on ethnic riots in India, where violence was common, but never at the level that would trigger the interest of most insurgency scholars). Expanding our understanding of what the relivant literature is may help correct such bias.

In my opinion, the one way that we can distinguish between 'conventional wars' and 'insurgencies' is actually suggesting in the new literature on social movement theory that Betz points to as the next step forward. Scholars like Wiktorowicz (who he mentions) as well as Janine Clark, Diane Singerman, and Carrie Wickham all look at ways that opposition groups in the Middle East utilize non-traditional means of networking supporters. Examples include the use of mosque sermons, work in social service institutions, neighborhood groups, and kin units. To me, it is the ways in which insurgencies are reliant on such mechanisms to rally support and form operational units that makes them distinct from more conventional wars, and our growing understanding of how such interpersonal networks operate is critical to expanding our understanding how to fight them. Furthermore, this literature tends to place a much greater stress on local factors that allow particular networks to be more or less powerful (see Roger Petersen for a good example of how this stuff applies to insurgent recruitment and mobilization), which seems like a good reminder for everyone, given the difficulties in transforming our Iraq policy to fit Afghan society.

h/t to abu m

Not all "Nos" are created equal

The vast majority of the western articles documenting the Arab response to Obama's Cairo Speech have trumpeted it's success with Arab moderates, while lumping the majority of Islamist reactions as a rejection of the Presidents remarks. Typical of the responses was Radio Free Europe: "Initial reactions... were generally but not universally positive, ranging from a broad welcome by government officials and moderate clerics to outright rejection by some Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt."

What puzzles me about the about the above reactions is the the assumption that all groups objecting to the speech did so for the same reasons. I think the range of objections raised by Islamist show some pretty powerful distinctions that point to the USA's ability to work with these groups in the future.

First of all, I think its important to note that the most stark denunciation came before Obama had even spoken. Osama bin Ladin's tape has received the most press, but theres also this round up of the comments on some of the prominent jihadi forums. While these opinions represent an important voice, general denouncements of the new president without even listening to the speech also indicate that these groups aren't all that interested in hearing whats being said. This is a pretty good sign (if we needed more of them) that these groups arent going to be particularly open to dialogue and public diplomacy. However, these also werent the people the president was speaking to.

Instead I think the more important groups are the extremist opposition groups that are active int he politics of the countries they are active in, that is groups like the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Hizbollah, and the Sadrist. These are the groups that the US is going to have to negotiate with in the next four years, and they hold a much greater sway in Arab public opinion. These groups were neither as monolithic, or as negative, in their response then articles like the one above would indicate.

Below are statements from party officials that give a sense of the range of early reactions available in translation:

Coverage from Muslim Brotherhood's English Language site quoted a statement released by the party on Saturday:

The general principles of human rights, justice, the necessity of dialogue based on mutual respect and trust, and others which President Obama mentioned in his speech are unarguable,” the statement said affirming that the emotional phrases and eloquent language Obama used in his speech through which he tried to win the hearts of Muslims neither establish any justice nor restore any right to Muslims whether in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, or any other country in the Islamic world where Muslim bloodshed is found day and night under the planning and cunningness of the successive American administrations.

The statement also explained that Obama’s declaration of America’s continuing support for Israel to attain their security and failure to recognize the right of Palestinian resistance against Israeli occupation confirms that Obama is following the path of his predecessors in their double standards policy.

The statement also denounced the short and superficial reference to democracy and criticizing of the peoples calling for it in the Arab-Islamic world while ignoring the existing dictatorships and unjust and corrupt regimes which suppress their peoples and marginalize their roles.

The Brotherhood statement makes the unique and interesting move of complaining that the USA isnt doing enough to promote democracy. This makes a lot of sense internally (US backing would be a huge help if they want to be included fully in future Egyptian elections, particularly if Mubarak does step down), but it also has real implications in Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine.

Hamas seemed to offer a less unified front, with multiple Gaza spokesmen offering contradicting analysis of the speech. Hamas spokesman Ayman Taha stated:

Speaking about a policy of pursuing a war against extremism and working towards two states for peoples on Palestinian lands is no different from the policy of his predecessor, George W Bush.

However, another spokesman, Fawzi Barhoum remarked:

So all we can say is that there is a difference in the statements, and the statements of today did not include a mechanism that can translate his wishes and views into actions

and then went even further, claiming:

We think we can build on this speech... We can take positive things from the speech to open communications with Obama and the U.S. administration.

In the case of Hizbollah, who seems to have lost major ground in today's election, official party statements seem to be far more radical than those of individual politicians. An official statement on Saturday included:

"any change felt by the region's Muslim and Arab people in the speech is not related to a change in U.S, strategy, but rather to repeated [U.S.] failures in conquering Arab and Muslim states as well as the failure of policies."

The party said that this is mainly due to the [continued] "resistance by forces of resistance, liberation and independence. "

Hizbullah described president Obama's speech as a form of "smart talk that aims to polish Washington's deformed image. This does not rise up to the standard of a new strategy, or [political] objective by the new American administration."

AFP quotes Lebanonese MP, Hassan Fadlallah:

We do not sense any real change regardless of the language of the speech because violence in the region is practiced first and foremost by Israel and by the US armies of occupation, and not by the people who resist... The Islamic and Arab world does not need lectures, but real acts starting with a radical change toward the Palestinian cause.

Muqtada al-Sadr, leader of a prominent oppositional Shia faction in Iraq, as well as the now disarmed Jaish al-Mahdi also commented:

The honeyed and flowery speeches express only one thing - that America wants to adopt a different attitude in subduing the world and putting it under its control and globalization.

Sure, its possible that the statements being made available to English speaking audiences are intentionally moderated. Its also possible that in the next week we'll see much more radical language coming out of these groups. However, this small set of statements seems to have some interesting implications if they turn out to be representative.

1. A recognition of the presidents skills as an orator, while attempting to make the case that actions will have to speak louder then words. While this isnt a new strategy, letters like the one from Hamas leaked by CODE PINK show that these groups are also willing to name terms they would see as bridging that gap that are well within Obama's power, rather than insisting on action from Israel.
2. The further out of political and military power the group is, the harsher their reaction to the speech. al-Sadr, who probably had the harshest of the reactions, is not nearly the power in Iraqi politics that he was in 2005, whereas the Brotherhood is looking at a higher level of legitimacy then they have had in quiet some time, and is the author of the most moderate of the statements. Again, Obama may have more to work with in creating alliances here than it first appears.

The NYTimes does have an interesting piece the weekend on why the the speech was so powerful in undermining jihadist claims. Also, if you only read Obama's speech, I think you missed some of the impact. Luckily the new White House likes the intertubes, so the whole speech is up on youtube.

Back from a break, and a new home

Dear all:

I've been on a relatively long break from writing because of the demands of passing courses and such. Hopefully there will be a noticeable pick up in my posts. I'm also switching homes, and while I've moved some of my older stuff over here for context, I also will be writing on a much narrower range of topics on Phoenix of Athena then previously.

My goal here is to cover both current events and academic work on irregular warfare and opposition politics in the Middle East and South Asia. Obviously, these are two very broad topics that receive quite a bit of coverage, and my own writing will be limited by my experience.

You should feel free to email any questions or comments to me at phoenixofathena at gmail dot com